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OPTIMAL CONTRACTING FOR CATTLE FEEDING: AN ASSESSMENT OF 
CLIMATIC CONDITIONS 
 
Cattle feeding contracts currently being used in the United States differ not only in terms 
of their intrinsic incentive structures, but also in the way they allocate risks among the 
cattle owners and feeders. Typical yardage-feed and yardage-feed-markup contracts assign 
risks associated with fluctuating feed prices and feedlot performance of the cattle entirely 
to the cattle owner, while the latter magnifies the feed price risk through the markup. On 
the other hand, the cost-of-gain contracts assign feed price and feedlot performance risks to 
the feeders. Interestingly, commercial cattle feeding in the Great Plains is dominated by the 
yardage-feed and yardage-feed-markup contracts, while the cost-of-gain contracts are 
common in the Midwest (Weimar and Hallam 1990).  
Highly variable seasonal cattle performance and lack of economies of size of the 
feedlots in the Midwestern states are cited as plausible reasons for the use of cost-of-gain 
contracts (Loy et al. 1986, Weimar and Hallam 1990). Animal science research shows that 
feedlot performance of beef cattle significantly varies with precipitation, temperature, 
humidity, hours of sunshine, and wind speed (NRC 2000). A recent study shows that the 
introduction of value-based grid pricing of fed cattle decreases (increases) the tendency 
towards cost-of-gain (yardage-fee-plus-feed-cost) contracts in commercial cattle feeding in 
typical Midwestern climatic conditions (Rahman 2007). However, it is yet to examine the 
role of climatic conditions in the choice of cattle feeding contract forms and parameters. A 
major constraint for such research is that contract data are proprietary. 2 
 
This article examines optimal behavior of cattle feeders in different climatic 
conditions when cow-calf producers make optimal choices among contract types and 
pricing system alternatives using a unique approach that permits analysis without 
proprietary contract data. The investigation is carried out in a multiple task principal-agent 
framework using historical input and output price data in combination with simulated 
feedlot and carcass performance data for a large sample of feeder cattle. A widely-accepted 
dynamic biophysical model for beef cattle growth is adopted from the animal science 
literature and employed to simulate feedlot and carcass performance outcomes of  a large 
set of feeder cattle under actual climatic conditions of Red Oak, Iowa and Dodge City, 
Kansas. Respectively, these two locations represent typical Midwestern and Great Plains 
cattle feeding conditions.  Simulated feedlot and carcass performance data are then 
combined with historical price series to determine the optimal cattle feeding contracts 
under alternative fed cattle pricing methods and risk preference scenarios. The differences 
in the optimal incentive schemes for cattle feeding contracts in the two locations reflect the 
impact of climatic conditions on feedlot performance of the cattle and feed prices.  
The biophysical model has the capability of representing a much wider variety of 
factors that reflect animal as well as weather attributes and determine both yield and 
quality of beef production than allowed by typical revealed preference contract data, even 
when such data are available. Thus, optimal contract sensitivity can be examined with 
respect to a rich set of contract forms and preference structures. In general, this research 




Climatic Condition and Cattle Performance  
Empirical animal science research has established that feedlot performance of cattle 
depends crucially on environmental attributes, especially temperature, humidity, sunshine, 
wind speed, precipitation, and mud depth (NRC 2000). These factors influence cattle 
performance by influencing voluntary feed intake and required energy for maintenance in a 
complex manner. Cattle consume more feed to produce more heat to support a higher 
metabolic rate in cold weather and consume less feed in hot weather to reduce heat 
production (Fox and Tylutki 1998). In particular, feed intake increases (decreases) as the 
temperature falls below (above) 20
oC. Other adverse environmental conditions such as 
level of precipitation and mud, and wind speed accentuate the effects of ambient 
temperature (NRC, 2000). In order to take account of the net effect of temperature on 
voluntary feed intake by cattle, NRC (2000) uses current  effective temperature index 
(CETI) which is computed using the current average temperature, relative humidity, wind 
speed, and hours of sunlight (see Appendix Table 2). Voluntary feed intake by cattle 
decreases with the mud depth of the feedlot (NRC, 2000).    
The energy requirement for maintenance increases when effective ambient 
temperature increases above the upper critical temperature (UCT) or decreases below the 
lower critical temperature (LCT). These effects are called heat and cold stresses, 
respectively. During cold stress, animals loose heat to the environment and increase 
metabolism to produce adequate heat to maintain body temperature. Alternatively, during 
heat stress, an elevated body temperature results in increased tissue metabolic rate and 
animals need to exert extra effort to dissipate heat (NRC, 2000). Both UCT and LCT are 
functions of how much heat an animal produces and how much heat is lost to the 4 
 
environment (see Appendix Table 2). Heat production by an animal is a function of 
metabolizable energy intake and retained energy. On the other hand, the amount of heat 
loss by an animal depends on the environmental condition as well as animal specific 
attributes. Thus, the effects of heat or cold stress depends both on environmental and 
animal factors. 
In cold stress, factors primarily contributing to differences in animal heat loss 
include surface area, internal insulation, and external insulation. Surface area is a function 
of shrunk body weight and internal insulation is a function of an animal’s body condition 
score (BCS) (see Appendix Table 2). External insulation of an animal is provided by hair 
coat plus the layer of air surrounding the body. However, the effectiveness of hair as 
external insulation is influenced by wind, precipitation, mud, and hide thickness (NRC 
2000). For CETI>20
oC, Heat stress increases the required energy for maintenance (see 
Appendix Table 2).  
The temperature to which an animal had been previously exposed has an effect on 
an animal’s current basal metabolic rate, and the current temperature to which an animal is 
exposed affects the energy required to cope with the current direct effects of cold stress or 
heat stress (Fox and Tylutki, 1998). In addition to adjustment for the effects of current 
effective temperature (CETI) on the maintenance energy requirement, NRC (2000) also 
recommends adjustment for the effects of previous ambient temperature using previous 
effective temperature index (PETI). 
Weight gain by an animal from voluntarily consumed metabolizable energy and 
protein is a function of the net energy available for growth (NEFG) after accounting for 
maintenance requirements. Biophysical growth of beef cattle is lower (higher) in a climatic 5 
 
condition in which voluntary feed intake is lower (higher) and/or maintenance requirement 
is higher (lower). Thus, for given animal characteristics and nutrient contents of feed, beef 
cattle’s feedlot performance (e.g., average daily gain and feed efficiency) vary with 
climatic condition. This study examines how the variation in animal performance due to 
weather alters optimal cattle feeding contracts.  
 
Potential Moral Hazard in Contract Cattle Feeding 
Current U.S. cattle feeding contracts are of three major types: cost-of-gain (or fixed-price-
per-pound-of-gain), yardage-fee-plus-feed-cost, and yardage-fee-plus-feed-cost-plus-
markup (Weimar and Hallam 1990; Madsen 1996). With cost-of-gain contracts, cattle 
owners reimburse feeders at a fixed price per pound of weight gain, sometimes on a scale 
that depends on live weight levels (Madsen 1996). Because feed costs are borne entirely by 
cattle feeders, the incentive for reducing feed cost is very high, as also is incentive for 
higher and faster weight gain.  
Under yardage-fee-plus-feed-cost contracts (hereafter yardage-feed contracts), 
payment to the feeder is based on a fixed fee per animal per day (e.g., $0.25/animal/day) 
plus reimbursement for the amount of feed consumed. Other costs such as veterinary and 
labor are included in the yardage fee, possibly with a clause for excess death loss. Thus, 
feed price and feedlot performance risks are assigned to the cattle owner, and feeders have 
no incentive to save on feed costs. On the other hand, a positive yardage fee adds an 
incentive for the feeder to keep animals in the feedlot longer than may be necessary.  
The yardage-fee-plus-feed-cost-plus-markup contract (hereafter yardage-feed-
markup contract) is a variant of the yardage-feed contract. It involves reimbursement of 6 
 
feed cost and a smaller yardage fee (e.g., $0.05 per animal per day), but includes a 
percentage markup, or a fixed amount per ton of feed, above actual feed costs (Weimar and 
Hallam 1990). Compared to a yardage-feed contract, this provides an incentive to feed at a 
higher rate and lowers the incentive for keeping animals in the feed lot. 
Consistent feeding of a balanced diet with appropriate nutrient content and use of 
growth promoting implants (hereafter, implants) are the two most important cattle feeder 
choices that affect not only average daily gain and feed efficiency but also beef yield and 
quality. Animal science research shows that a high-grain (high-cost) ration during finishing 
increases the rate of gain and improves beef quality (Tedeschi, Fox, and Guiroy 2004; 
NRC 2000; Duckett et al. 1996). On the other hand, implants increase the rate of gain, feed 
efficiency, and yield but have a negative impact on quality (Tedeschi, Fox, and Guiroy 
2004; Field and Taylor 2002; Duckett et al. 1996). Feedlot performance and carcass 
composition thus depend crucially on the feeder’s ration and implant strategy given the 
biological characteristics of an animal and weather condition.  
Feeders’ choice of ration-implant strategy, in turn, alters cattle owners’ net returns 
under different fed cattle pricing methods. Current U.S. fed cattle pricing can be divided 
into two broad categories: traditional lot-average pricing and modern value-based pricing. 
Lot-average pricing includes live-weight and dressed-weight (also known as “in-the-beef”) 
pricing methods. Under live-weight pricing cattle are sold in lots on the basis of actual live 
weight and estimated lot-average beef yield and quality. All cattle in a lot receive the same 
price per pound of live weight regardless of differences in yield and quality. This 
emphasizes incentives for live weight gain rather than incremental yield and quality. 
Under, dressed-weight pricing, all carcasses in a lot receive the same average price per 7 
 
pound of dressed weight with an estimated average beef quality. Dressed-weight pricing 
compensates incremental yield. However, it does not offer clear incentives for quality. 
Modern value-based pricing refers to various grid pricing schemes. Grid pricing 
rewards yield and quality as well as weight incrementally by animal Under grid pricing, 
each individual carcass is priced on the basis of actual dressed weight with additional 
premiums and discounts for various carcass traits. Most grids consist of a base price with 
specified premiums and discounts for incremental quality and yield grades, weight groups, 
and carcass and cattle types (Ward, Feuz, and Schroeder 2000).  
Thus, incentive structures differ by fed cattle pricing methods and cattle feeding 
contracts. If incentives of cattle owners and feeders are not aligned, economic efficiency is 
unlikely. Under lot-average pricing, owners’ and feeders’ incentives can be aligned with 
the existing cattle feeding contracts as the rate of live weight gain and feed efficiency are 
of concern. Effects of climatic condition on cattle performance may be internalized with 
the choice of contract forms. However, under grid pricing, moral hazard is likely as none 
of the traditional contract types provide direct incentives for incremental beef quality.  
Contracts contingent on ex post measures of yield and beef quality are not observed 
in reality. Typically, feeders’ choice of ration-implant strategies are not observable or 
verifiable to cattle owners. Thus, contracts contingent on feeders’ actions cannot be 
enforced, which raises a moral hazard problem. First-best outcomes are possible only if the 
owner’s and feeder’s contribution to actual yield and quality can be measured and 
rewarded separately. However, the actual yield and quality of the carcass can be measured 
only after slaughter. Thus, the feeder’s contribution through the ration-implant choice 
cannot be distinguished from breeder’s contribution through genetic traits. The only 8 
 
practical measurable and verifiable attributes are feed cost, live weight gain by each 
animal, and the length of time the animal stays in the feedlot (hereafter days-on-feed). 
These are the enforceable variables included in cattle feeding contracts in current use.  
Multitask principal-agent analysis (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991) suggests that if 
feeders’ cost saving and beef quality improving activities are inseparable and substitutes, 
and the cost saving activity is verifiable but the quality improving activity is not, then a 
contract with a low incentive for cost saving (e.g., a yardage-feed contract) may be optimal 
if beef quality is a concern. This study determines the extent to which this is true under 
both traditional live- and dressed-weight pricing versus grid pricing under alternative 
climatic conditions. 
 
The Empirical Framework 
Suppose a cattle owner contracts the feeding of N cattle with a feeder having a one-time 
capacity to feed n cattle (n ≥ N). Suppose the cattle feeding contract is represented by a 
triple, ( , , ), αβγ  where α  is the yardage fee per animal per day, β is the payment per 
pound of gain, and γ is the owner’s share of feed cost. The feeder’s net profit from feeding 
animal i is thus 
(1)  [ ( 1) ] i i ii i g gfr cd π αβ γ =+ +− −  for i = 1.,,,.n, 
where gi is average daily weight gain in pounds, fi is feed per pound of gain (feed 
efficiency), r is the price per pound of feed, c is non-feed cost per animal per day, and di is 
days on feed. Equation (1) represents a cost-of-gain contract if  0, αγ = =  a yardage-feed 
contract if  0 β =  and  1, γ =  and a yardage-feed-markup contract if  0 β =  and  1. γ >  
  Beef cattle nutrition research shows that, for a given target weight gain, di and fi 9 
 
decrease with the grain (or energy) content of feed and implant potency, and that grain 
content of feed and implant potency are substitutes (NRC 2000). Feed cost is increasing in 
grain content, and implant cost is increasing in potency. Trivially, the incentive for feed 
cost saving is decreasing in the owner’s share ( ). γ  The minimum payment per pound of 
gain necessary to induce a feeder to feed the cattle,  , β  is highest when  0, αγ = =  and 
lower as α  and γ  are higher. Thus, the feeder’s incentive for cost saving (i.e., the power 
of the incentive scheme) increases with β  and decreases with α  and  . γ   
  The cattle owner’s profit (incremental profit compared to selling feeder calves) 
from contracting a feedlot to feed and sell each fed animal i on a grid that uses the cash 
live-weight price, p1, as the base price can be expressed as 
(2)  10 ( ) ( ) , 1,..., , i i i i ii i i PW w g gfrd pw i N αβ γ Π= − − + + − =  
where  11 1 ( )( ) i y qi P p p pypq θθ θ = + − + ∆+ ∆  is the grid price, θi and θ  are actual and 
expected dressing percentages, Δy and Δq are incremental yield and quality grades with 
respective premiums py and pq for incremental yield and quality grades, Wi is the final 
shrunk body weight of the fed animal, wi is the initial shrunk body weight of the feeder 
calf, and p0 is the price of feeder calves (all cattle prices in cents per pound of live weight). 
Equation (2) nests dressed-weight pricing (where py = 0 and pq = 0) and live-weight pricing 
(where additionally  ) i θθ =  within the grid pricing framework. 
Both the cattle owner’s choice of payment scheme and the feeder’s ration-implant 
choice for a given payment scheme depend on risk preferences. Both are assumed to 
follow constant absolute risk aversion where outcomes with individual animals are random 
draws as described below. Because profits are spread over many cattle, a Central Limit 10 
 
result with bounded mean and variance motivates an assumption of normality of average 
profit per animal, 
1 (1/ )
n
i i n ππ
= = ∑  and 
1 (1/ ) ,
N
i i N
= Π= Π ∑  for both feeder and owner. 
Thus, respective expected utilities are represented as 
(3)  ( ( )) [exp( )] EU E n π ϕπ = −−  
(4)  ( ( )) [exp( )] EV E N ψ Π= − − Π  
where U and V are utility functions with respective absolute risk aversion levels φ and ψ. 
For given target weight gain, nutrient content of feed, and implant potency, di and fi 
varies with weather condition, thus altering the feeder’s and owner’s profits and expected 
utility. However, the effects of weather condition on the optimal choice of α, β, and γ are 
ambiguous and needs to be determined empirically. While this model could be empiricized 
with ranch-to-rail data and revenues and costs for cattle fed under various contract 
arrangements, such data are proprietary and difficult to acquire, especially as a random 
sample. Further, even when compiled by survey methods, data typically lack the wide 
range of contract parameters and feeder actions that can affect carcass yield and quality, 
which are essential in identifying the motivation and potential for contracting. To 
overcome these obstacles, this study uses a dynamic bio-physical model for beef cattle 
growth developed by animal scientists (Tedeschi, Fox, and Guiroy 2004; NRC 2000), 
which permits consideration of a wide array of feeder behavior and prospective incentives 
of alternative contract types. 
 
A Simulation Model of Biophysical Growth of Beef Cattle  
Lofgreen and Garrett (1968) published a simple beef cattle growth simulation model to 
compute feed requirements for a given live weight gain given energy contents of feeds. 11 
 
Fox and Black (1977) altered their model to predict performance when voluntary feed 
intake by individual animals is known. Fox and Black (1984) generalized the model to 
account for individual animal characteristics, implants, and feed additives. Successive 
modifications have improved accuracy under alternative management practices and 
circumstances (Fox, Sniffen, and O’Connor 1988; Fox et al. 1992; Tylutki, Fox, and 
Anrique 1994; Perry and Fox 1997). Upon critical evaluation with experimental data, 
successive Subcommittees on Beef Cattle Nutrition of the National Research Council 
(hereafter NRC) have fully accepted the revised model (see NRC 2000). Tedeschi, Fox, 
and Guiroy (2004) have further extended the model with daily time steps. 
Combining the day-step model with other complementary sub-models published in 
various issues of the Journal of Animal Science, Rahman (2007) constructs an integrated 
dynamic growth simulation model that is capable of simultaneously predicting voluntary 
feed intake, resulting weight gain, and carcass composition for a wide range of ration-
implant strategies. Major independent variables are biological characteristics of individual 
animal’s (e.g., age, sex, initial shrunk body weight, breed, frame and body condition 
scores, hide thickness, and hair depth), energy and protein contents of feed, and the 
condition of the feeding environment (e.g., temperature, humidity, hours of sunlight, and 
wind speed). Implementation of the model requires either a given final shrunk body weight 
or a given length of feeding period. The complete model is available in an unpublished 
appendix. 
 The growth model is used to simulate feeding outcomes of 1,147 steers actually 
fed under the Tri-County Steer Carcass Futurity Program (hereafter TCSCF) in Iowa. The 
steers were placed in feedlots located in Red Oak, Iowa, during October-December of 12 
 
1995-98 and slaughtered during April-June of the following year. The data contains 
individual cow and calf information provided by cow-calf producers, feedlot performance 
recorded by the feeders, and carcass data reported by the packers. After careful review, 22 
observations were omitted because the daily gain or feed efficiency was both implausible 
and far out of range of the simulation model even with the most aggressive ration and 
implant strategy. Table 2 presents summary statistics of retained observations. 
Six finishing rations are considered using four ingredients: corn grain, corn silage, 
soybean meal, and alfalfa hay. While the model can consider any practical ration, the feed 
choice is important only as it affects the energy and nutrient content of the ration. We 
choose a small number of alternatives representing the typical range of cattle feeding 
practices to facilitate reporting of the research. Composition of the rations and associated 
nutritional characteristics following the NRC (2000) are presented in table 3. 
Following guidelines of Field and Taylor (2002) and Duckett et al. (1996), any 
implants are assumed to occur at the time of placement on the finishing ration and again 
after 90 days. Three alternative implant strategies are considered: no implant, moderate 
implant (estrogen only), and aggressive implant (estrogen plus Trenbolone Acetate). Thus, 
18 (6×3) ration-implant strategies are considered.  
Outcomes are simulated using actual environmental conditions during the feeding 
period in Red Oak, Iowa, and Dodge City, Kansas. Daily averages of temperature, relative 
humidity, hours of sunshine, and wind speed in these locations were obtained from 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and  WeatherBank 
Incorporation, a meteorological consulting company. Monthly averages and standard 
deviations of these weather variables for the two locations are reported in table 4. As 13 
 
highlighted in table 4, monthly average temperature, wind speed, and hours of sunshine in 
Dodge City, Kansas are higher and relative humidity is lower than the averages in Red 
Oak, Iowa.   
 
Simulation Results  
Using final shrunk body weight as the terminal feeding point for each animal, the 
biophysical growth model is used to simulate the carcass performance of each of the 1,125 
steers day-by-day for each of the 18 ration-implant strategies (see the unpublished 
appendix for details). To verify the growth model, a comparison of simulated outcomes 
with actual outcomes reported by the TCSCF showed that the model approximates with 
acceptable accuracy actual days on feed (for given final shrunk body weight), final body 
weight (for given days on feed), carcass weight, and quality grade (see Rahman 2007). For 
yield grade, the model predicts qualitative variation but understates quantitative variation 
(Rahman, 2007; Tedeschi, Fox, and Guiroy 2004), which is sufficient for determining 
optimal contract structure aside from biasing the optimal premium incentive for yield grade 
under grid pricing. 
  A summary of simulated outcomes for selected variables under the 18 ration-
implant strategies is presented in table 5. The results indicate that for a target weight gain, 
days on feed and feed efficiency decrease with the grain content of the ration and potency 
of the implant. Yield grade increases and quality grade decreases with empty body fat 
percentage (not shown), which in turn increases with grain content of feed and decreases 
with more aggressive implants. Thus, yield (quality) grade increases (decreases) with grain 
content and decreases (increases) with implant potency. However, the grain effect is small 14 
 
(about 0.21-0.31 percent for a 10 percent substitution of silage for grain) but substantial for 
a change in implant strategy (4.9 and 5.1 percent from no to moderate and from moderate 
to aggressive, respectively).  
The simulation results thus imply that grain content and implant potency affect 
days on feed and feed efficiency in the same direction, but have opposite effects on beef 
quality. The substitution effect has profound implications for the incentive structure of 
optimal cattle feeding contracts, especially if quality is not measurable or verifiable until 
after slaughter.  
As highlighted in table 5, climatic condition affects feedlot performance only 
leaving carcass yield and quality the same. Compared to feedlot performance in Red Oak, 
Iowa, days required to reach a target weight gain is higher while average daily gain and 
feed required per pound of weight gain are lower in Dodge City, Kansas.  
 
Price Data 
The feedlot and carcass performance data generated by the simulation model are used in 
combination with price data, contract parameter values, and risk aversion coefficients to 
calculate owner’s and feeder’s expected profits and utilities following (1)-(4). For this 
purpose, January 1996-December 1999 five-area (Texas/Oklahoma, Kansas, Nebraska, 
Colorado, Iowa/So. Minnesota) weekly weighted average live- and dressed-weight prices 
for fed cattle, weekly average prices of feeder cattle of different weight groups and frame 
sizes, national weekly average yield and quality grade premiums and discounts paid in 
various grids, weekly average prices for corn in Iowa and Kansas during 1996-99, weekly 
average prices for soybean meal in Decatur IL, and weekly average prices for alfalfa hay in 15 
 
Kansas were obtained from the U.S. Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS). The latter two 
are used in place of widely quoted prices in Iowa. Following the guidelines of the Iowa 
State University Extension Service, the price per ton of usable silage is determined as 9 
times the per bushel corn price, with adjustment to 34% dry matter content for use in the 
growth model (Edwards, 2005). 
  Following Schroeder et al. (2003), base grid prices are calculated from live-weight 
prices with adjustment to an estimated dressing percentage (62.30%) plus $1.00 per 
hundred pounds of carcass. The estimate of the dressing percentage is obtained by 
regressing live-weight prices on dressed-weight prices without an intercept term. The costs 
of individual feeder animals are calculated from the prices for different weight groups and 
frame sizes using prices on the particular week of delivery of each feeder. 
  So that results apply to typical cattle feeding conditions, cattle prices and feed costs 
are simulated using 100,000 observations drawn randomly from a multivariate distribution 
estimated using a Gaussian kernel function. Non-feed costs (e.g., labor, utility, and interest 
on feed) per animal per day are obtained from historical profitability reports of three Iowa 
feedlots (Cody Feedlot, CRI Feeders, and Silver Creek Feeders). Prices for single doses of 
a widely used moderate implant (Synovex S) and high-potency implant (Synovex Plus) 
were obtained from Duckett et al. (1996), which are the same as quoted by 
www.CattleStore.com in August 2006. These costs are treated as nonrandom. 
 
Feasible Contract Parameter Space  
Because of minor nonconcavities in the simulation model, we determine optimal choices of 
both owner and feeder over all practical combinations of (,,) αβγ  with a grid search of 16 
 
0.01 accuracy. Imposing zero lower parameter limits and individual rationality with zero 
reservation incomes (revenues for both owner and feeder must be at least equal to their 
shares of feed cost), we consider all remaining combinations ( , , ). αβγ  If the owner 
transfers all revenue from feeding (including sale of fed animals minus cost of feeder 
animals) to the feeder, then the owner’s and feeder’s participation constraints imply 
 (5)  10 [ ( ) ]/ , ii i ii i i i i gfr c g gfr PW w pw d αβ γ +≤ +⋅ + ≤ + −  
which implies maximum possible values  0.49, 0.47,and 1.45. αβ γ ≤≤ ≤  We call this the 
unrestricted parameter space. 
To examine whether contract forms in current use can be explained by the model, a 
restricted parameter space is also considered where additionally either  0 γ =  (the case of a 
cost-of-gain contract if  0) α =  or  0 β =  and  1 γ ≥  (the case of a yardage-feed contract if 
1 γ =  or a yardage-feed-markup contract if  1). γ >  
 
Risk Aversion Coefficients for the Owner and Feeder 
Because estimates of relative risk aversion generally vary less than estimates of absolute 
risk aversion, the coefficients of constant absolute risk aversion are chosen to match 
plausible values of relative risk aversion. Saha, Shumway, and Talpaz (1994) report a brief 
survey of estimates of relative risk aversion that range from 0 to 18.8 with a median 
roughly near 2. A survey of cattle feeders and cow-calf producers shows that feedlot 
operations have capacities from 55 to 89,000 animals, averaging about 5,000, and cow-calf 
operations varies from 10 to 4,500 cattle, averaging about 500 animals (Feuz and 
Umberger, 2001). Mark, Schroeder, and Jones (2000) report that cattle feeders’ averaged 
$15 profit per animal during 1980-1997, while Marsh and Feuz (2002) reported average 17 
 
returns to cow-calf producers of $93 per animal during 1980-96. 
  The possible range of feeder and owner constant absolute risk aversion are 
calibrated accordingly following 𝜑𝜑 � = 𝑛𝑛𝜑𝜑𝑛𝑛 and 𝜓𝜓 � = 𝑁𝑁𝜓𝜓Π where 𝜑𝜑 � and 𝜓𝜓 � are respective 
relative risk aversion coefficients at mean profit levels. Substituting 𝜑𝜑 � = 𝜓𝜓 � =18.8, high 
risk aversion is represented by φ = 0.023 for feeders and ψ = 0.020 for owners. Moderate 
risk aversion is represented by ψ = φ = 0.0025, which corresponds to relative risk aversion 
near 2, and low risk aversion is represented by ψ = φ = 0.00025, which corresponds to 
relative risk aversion near 0.2. 
 
Optimal Cattle Feeding Contracts and Feeder Strategies 
For each feasible combination of contract parameter values and absolute risk aversion 
coefficients, the mean and variance of owner and feeder profits from feeding each animal 
in the sample are calculated by combining simulated cattle performance data with 100,000 
randomly drawn price vectors according to equations (1) and (2). The expected feeder 
utility per animal under each ration-implant strategy and the expected owner utility under 
each fed cattle pricing method are computed according to equations (3) and (4). 
  Searching the entire parameter space, the results find the Stackelberg equilibrium 
whereby the feeder chooses the optimal ration-implant strategy for each feasible ( , , ), αβγ  
and then the owner chooses the optimal incentive scheme represented by (,,) αβγ  
assuming the feeder maximizes utility with that incentive scheme. This procedure is 
repeated for live-weight, dressed-weight, and grid pricing methods with both the 
unrestricted and restricted parameter spaces and various levels of risk aversion.  
The results for Red Oak, Iowa and Dodge City, Kansas are presented in tables 6 18 
 
and 7, respectively. In general, the results show that optimal feeding contracts and 
strategies vary with the incentive structure depending on fed cattle pricing methods, risk 
aversion levels, and weather condition. Interestingly, the optimal contract coefficients and 
ration-implant strategies are identical under live- and dressed-weight pricing methods for 
each of the risk aversion scenarios. This is due to the similar incentive structures implied 
by the linear relationship between live and carcass weight in the growth model. 
Accordingly, these results are reported in a single group of columns. 
 
Optimal Contracts in the Unrestricted Parameter Space 
The unrestricted parameter optimization results of tables 6 and 7 show that the optimal β  
is higher and optimal values of α  and γ  are generally lower under traditional pricing than 
under grid pricing. This holds for each risk preference scenario except a few cases. The 
optimal α  is slightly higher under traditional pricing with moderate owner risk aversion 
and γ  is equal with high owner and feeder risk aversion in Iowa. The optimal α is higher 
under traditional pricing with high owner risk aversion in Kansas. Except in cases with low 
owner risk aversion in Iowa, which are not supported by further analysis below, these 
incentive differences generate the striking contrast whereby traditional pricing leads to a 
less costly ration (30-50 percent corn) along with an aggressive implant, whereas grid 
pricing induces a costly ration strategy (60-80 percent corn) but a moderate implant. These 
results illustrate that contract parameters have roughly opposite effects on cost saving and 
carcass quality. Comparing traditional and grid pricing, cost savings from low energy 
rations 1 and 3 is induced by a higher payment per pound of gain ( ), β  a lower yardage fee 
( ), α  and a lower owner share of feed cost ( ), γ  while carcass quality improvement with a 19 
 
moderate rather than aggressive implant is induced by opposite contract types.  
  Under traditional pricing, optimal unrestricted contract parameters are remarkably 
insensitive to risk preferences of both owner and feeder except in one case for Iowa, where 
the owner is risk neutral and the feeder is highly risk averse. With less risk aversion, the 
owner is willing to share more of the feed cost, while higher feeder risk aversion results in 
a greater response in ration selection to the feed cost share. Some of this tendency applies 
when the owner has low risk aversion and the feeder has high risk aversion, while some of 
the opposite effect is observed in the case where risk preferences are reversed. 
Under grid pricing, higher owner risk aversion tends toward an incentive scheme 
with a higher yardage fee, higher incentive for gain, and less owner-sharing of feed cost. 
With less owner-share of feed cost, the feeder is induced to cut feed costs by selecting a 
lower energy ration. But interestingly, the highest energy ration (80 percent corn) is 
induced at a moderate level of owner risk aversion with either no or high feeder risk 
aversion in Iowa. Slight nonconcavities in the growth model may account for some of this 
peculiarity. But the major increase in gain incentive in moving from low to moderate 
owner risk aversion as β almost triples from 0.03 to 0.08 may explain the feeder’s choice 
of a costly ration. 
 
Optimal Contracts in the Restricted (Traditional) Parameter Space 
The lower parts of tables 6 and 7 consider the restricted parameter space (traditional 
contract types). Remarkably, with traditional contract types the owner’s optimal incentive 
scheme does not depend on feeder risk aversion except one case in Kansas moderate owner 
risk aversion and high feeder risk aversion. Unless owner risk aversion is moderate to high, 20 
 
the optimal contract is a yardage-feed-markup contract ( 0, 1). βγ = >  Interestingly, the 
owner offers exactly the same contract under both traditional and grid pricing, which 
induces the feeder to choose the same high-energy-moderate-implant ration (80 percent 
corn). This outcome does not appear to match reality given the predominant use of 
aggressive implants. Thus, we conclude that typical owners have at least moderate risk 
aversion. 
  Considering moderate risk aversion by the owner in Iowa, the owner chooses a 
cost-of-gain contract ( 0) αγ = =  under traditional pricing, and a yardage-feed contract 
( 0, 1) βγ = =  under grid pricing. The case with high owner risk aversion is similar 
although the result under grid pricing is not quite in the form of a yardage-feed contract (γ 
is less than 1). In the case of moderate risk aversion by the owner in Kansas, the owner 
chooses a cost-of-gain contract ( 0) αγ = =  under traditional pricing unless the feeder has 
high risk aversion, and a yardage and feed cost sharing contract (γ is less than 1) under grid 
pricing. With moderate owner risk aversion and high feeder risk aversion, optimal 
incentive schemes are the same under traditional and grid pricing. The case with high 
owner risk aversion is similar to that of Iowa. These results generate the sharp contrast 
whereby traditional pricing leads to a low energy ration (30-50 percent corn) with an 
aggressive implant, whereas grid pricing leads to a moderately high energy ration (60-80 
percent corn) with a moderate implant. This sharp contrast is similar to the unrestricted 
results, verifying that grid pricing indeed tends toward higher quality beef production by 
aligning incentives across the supply chain. 
Remarkably, the optimal incentive schemes chosen from the restricted parameter 
space represent each of the three standard contract types (even though one of parameters is 21 
 
chosen freely in two cases, i.e.,  0 α =  is not imposed when  0 γ =  nor is  1 γ =  imposed 
when  0). β =  is not imposed when  0 γ =  nor is  1 γ =  imposed when  0). β =  Thus, the 
model helps to explain contract variations observed in practice. Interestingly, a typical 
linear incentive structure with  0, 0, and  0 αβ γ >> =  (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1987, 
1991), as is included in both restricted and unrestricted parameter spaces, never emerges as 
optimal, nor is it hardly observed in the reality of cattle feeding. 
 
Effects of Weather Condition 
Results in tables 6 and 7 clearly show that optimal contract coefficients and ration-implant 
strategies are different for the two locations considered in this paper. With both the 
unrestricted and restricted parameter spaces, the incentive for cost saving in Kansas is 
either lower or the same as in Iowa. The differences are due to the variation in animal 
performance attributed to weather condition and regional difference in feed prices.  
Considering traditional contract types and less than moderate risk aversion by the 
owner, yardage-feed-markup contracts are optimal in both locations. However, optimal 
yardage fee is higher and markup on feed costs is lower in Kansas while the optimal 
ration-implant strategy is the same (80 percent corn with an aggressive implant) for both 
locations. With moderate owner risk aversion and less than high feeder risk aversion under 
traditional pricing, cost-of-gain contracts are optimal in both locations while the payment 
per pound of gain is higher for Kansas with costly ration (50-70 percent corn). Grain 
content of ration decreases with Kansas feeder risk aversion within none to moderate 
range. With moderate owner risk aversion and high feeder risk aversion, a cost-of-gain 
contract with a less costly ration-implant strategy (30 percent corn with an aggressive 22 
 
implant) is optimal for Iowa while a yardage fee plus cost share contract with a costly 
ration-implant strategy (40 percent corn with a moderate implant) is optimal for Kansas. 
With high owner risk aversion under traditional pricing, cost-of-gain contracts are optimal 
in both locations irrespective of feeder risk aversion. However, grain content of ration 
decreases with Kansas feeder risk aversion.  
For moderate owner risk aversion under grid pricing, a yardage-feed contract is 
optimal in Iowa and a higher yardage plus feed cost share contract is optimal in Kansas.  
For high owner risk aversion, yardage plus feed cost share contracts are optimal in both 
locations while yardage fee is higher and the owner’s share of feed cost is lower in Kansas. 
However, optimal ration-implant strategy is the same for both locations.  
 
Congruence with Reality 
Rahman (2007) suggests that feeders have a substantial interest in restricting the contract 
parameter space to traditional forms under the moderate to high owner risk aversion unless 
feeder risk aversion is high. Studies have found that cow-calf producers who retain 
ownership of feeder calves through slaughter face substantial price and production risks 
(Popp et al. 2007, Marsh and Feuz 2002). Given the small scale of beef production herds, 
moderate to high levels of risk aversion are likely. Only about 10 percent of U.S. cow-calf 
operations have more than 100 breeding cows (Field and Taylor 2002) and many have less 
than 30 (Ward 1997). 
Further, restriction of the parameter space is feasible only if feeders have sufficient 
bargaining power to impose traditional (restricted) contract forms. While a feeder can 
certainly refuse certain contact forms, the fact that the traditional forms of contracts are 23 
 
observed in reality suggests that an owner can shop among feeders to find a traditional 
contract of preferred form, even though no feeder may consent to offer contracts outside of 
traditional forms. Thus, the results whereby the feeder can successfully restrict the 
parameter space but not the form of the restricted contract seem to fit reality. Certainly, 
cattle owners choose the fed cattle pricing method because they retain ownerships of the 
cattle until completion of feeding. Thus, given that feeders can restrict the parameter space 
while owners choose contracts within the restricted contract space as well as the fed cattle 
pricing method, results in tables 6 and 7 appear to both harmonize with reality and offer a 
rationalization of predominant choices. 
  As a check on these results, more than 30 feedlot operators in Iowa and 20 feedlot 
operators in Kansas were contacted directly by telephone or email in 2005. Majority of the 
Iowa feedlot operators reported that yardage fee ranged from $0.05 to $0.25 per animal per 
day while markup on feed cost ranged from 0 to 20 percent. Few Iowa feedlot operators 
reported the cost-of-gain to be around $0.40 per pound. As reported by Kansas feedlot 
operators, yardage fee ranged from $0.25 to $0.35 per animal per day and markup on feed 
cost ranged from 0 to 10 percent. While cost-of-gain contract is rare in Kansas, one feedlot 
operator reported $0.45 as the cost of live weight gain per pound. In the plausible case of 
moderate risk aversion, the yardage fees and costs-of-gain selected in tables 6 and 7 are 
within the range of the reported values. However, none of the feedlot operators reported 
cost sharing.  
The results in the last two rows of table 6 and last six rows in table 7, which appear 
to be the likely cases of reality, also suggest that the introduction of modern grid pricing 
naturally leads to a shift from cost-of-gain contracts( 0) αγ = =  to yardage-feed contracts 24 
 
( 0, 1). βγ = =  Several feedlot operators in Iowa reported that they had switched from cost-
of-gain contracts to yardage-feed contracts, while none of them reported switching from 
yardage-feed contracts to cost-of-gain contracts.  However, for alternative levels of owner 
and feeder risk aversion, there appears to be a larger scope of cost-of-gain contracts in 
Iowa.  
The optimization results further indicate that average beef quality improves with 
the adoption of grid pricing. For this set of cattle, the average resulting beef quality is 
“Select” under live- and dressed- weight pricing, and “Choice” under grid pricing. Thus, 
grid pricing indeed appears to promise improvement in beef quality as many have hoped. 
Thus, the model and its results appear to fit reality quite well and explain observed 
practices and tendencies in contract cattle feeding and marketing.  
 
Summary and Conclusions 
This article presents a unique approach to examine the optimal behavior of the cattle 
owners and feeders involved in contract cattle feeding under various contract provisions in 
different climatic conditions. A biophysical model for beef cattle growth is adopted from 
the animal science literature and applied under cattle feeding contract optimization to 
examine contract parameter sensitivity to climatic conditions. Results indicate that 
observed behavior is best rationalized by moderate levels of risk aversion, in which case 
the results explain several observed phenomena: (i) emergence of typical contract types, 
(ii) variant cattle feeding contracts across geographic locations with different climatic 
conditions, and (iii) a tendency to replace cost-of-gain contracts with yardage-feed 
contracts as grid pricing has emerged. 25 
 
  The examination of incentives and outcomes in an unusually comprehensive 
parameter and behavioral space in this study is made possible by using a biophysical 
model together with detailed data on a large lot of cattle and public price and weather data. 
Revealed preference data, even in the rare case where proprietary contract data can be 
collected, cannot hope to examine the extent of choice sets considered here. In the 
simulation model, carcass yield and quality improving inputs are substitutes in the 
production. These tradeoffs play a large role in determining the critical results, but would 
be hard to identify by means of econometric examination of revealed preference data with 
its likely narrow ranges of choice. In this respect, this study is an example of how more 
comprehensive answers can be gained from economic analysis by taking advantage of 
biophysical relationships that have been measured in substantial detail by the production 
sciences. Moreover, much more detail is facilitated by this approach than we can illustrate 
in the space of a journal article. 
  For future research, we suggest that finding an efficient approach that aligns 
incentives for the complete supply chain must also consider the packer’s welfare. Packers 
are almost certainly a partial beneficiary of the reduced welfare obtained by the 
combination of feeder and owner in the prisoner’s dilemma result. Important issues in this 
broader context include both risk sharing between the owner and packer, and selection of 
appropriate premiums and discounts in grid pricing structures, both of which are largely 
packer-determined but affect the owner-feeder relationship.26 
 
Footnotes 
1 The yield grade (Y) of a carcass is defined numerically as Y = 2.5 + 2.5T + 0.2K + 
0.0038H – 0.32R where T is thickness (in inches) of fat over the rib-eye muscle, K is 
kidney, pelvic, and heart fat as a percentage of carcass weight, H is hot carcass weight (in 
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1  2  3  4  5 
Prime  6-14  5-12  4-10  (1-10)  (7-15) 
CAB
  3-9  2-7  1-5  (6-13)  (12-18) 
Choice  2-4  1-2  Base  (11-14)  (17-19) 
Select  (0-23)  (2-24)  (4-25)  (15-39)  (21-44) 
Standard  (8-29)  (10-30)  (12-31)  (23-45)  (29-50) 
Note: CAB stands for Certified Angus Beef. Numbers in parenthesis are negative. 
Additional discounts apply: light carcasses (1-6 for 550-599 lbs., 12-21 for 500-550 lbs., 
and 19-29 for 400-500 lbs.); heavy carcasses (0-2 for 901-950 lbs., 4-11 for 950-1,000 lbs., 
and 13-22 for over 1,000 lbs.); dark cutters (23-34); hard bones (20-31); dairy (0-8) and 
bullocks (17-28). 
Source: Agricultural Marketing Service. 32 
 
Table 2. Summary Statistics of the TCSCF cattle (1,125 observations) 
Variable  Mean  Standard 
Deviation  Minimum  Maximum 
Age on Placement (days)  217  29  122  337 
Initial Body Weight (lbs)  548.6  83.1  272  838 
Frame Score  4.7  1.1  0.8  7.9 
Days on Feed  201  21  148  239 
Final Body Weight (lbs)  1,154.2  87.5  896  1,530 
Hot Carcass Weight (lbs)  703.4  59.1  512  938 
Yield Grade  2.6  0.6  0.6  4.5 
Quality Grade  3.4  0.7  1  5 
Note: For frame scores, 1 is small and 9 is large. For yield grades, 1 is high and 5 is low. 
For quality grades, 1 is prime, 2 is CAB, 3 is choice, 4 is select, and 5 is standard. 
Source: TriCounty Steer Carcass Futurity Cooperative (TCSCF). 33 
 
Table 3. Composition and Nutrient Content (per kg Dry Matter) of Six Rations 
Ration  Composition  NEm  NEg  ME  MP 
(Co:Si:SM:AH)  (Mcal.)  (Mcal.)  (Mcal.)  (Grams) 
Ration 1  30:50:10:10  1.841  1.204  2.775  105.42 
Ration 2  40:40:10:10  1.889  1.246  2.833  109.01 
Ration 3  50:30:10:10  1.937  1.288  2.891  112.60 
Ration 4  60:20:10:10  1.985  1.330  2.949  116.19 
Ration 5  70:10:10:10  2.033  1.372  3.007  119.79 
Ration 6  80:00:10:10  2.081  1.414  3.065  123.38 
Note: The proportions of ingredients are ordered as corn (Co), corn silage (Si), soybean 
meal (SM), and alfalfa hay (AH); NEm is net energy for maintenance; NEg is net energy 
for growth; ME is metabolizable energy; and MP is metabolizable protein.  































  IA  KS  IA  KS  IA  KS  IA  KS 
January  -4.53  0.34  75.37  64.20  14.94  20.42  3.67  6.58 
  (7.67)  (4.42)  (10.54)  (11.49)  (7.11)  (3.67)  (3.39)  (2.13) 
February  0.66  2.57  72.27  63.65  14.77  21.12  4.18  6.86 
  (6.96)  (4.7)  (11.06)  (11.99)  (6.6)  (3.31)  (3.45)  (2.19) 
March  1.89  7.13  69.81  61.42  17.28  43.33  4.09  7.81 
  (7.27)  (4.32)  (10.72)  (10.71)  (7.68)  (21.41)  (3.96)  (2.46) 
April  10.70  12.36  66.29  60.45  17.69  24.14  4.51  8.96 
  (4.91)  (3.73)  (14.29)  (9.21)  (8.04)  (3.33)  (3.92)  (2.34) 
May  16.92  18.24  69.70  64.86  15.44  22.52  5.47  9.57 
  (4.36)  (3.18)  (13.91)  (8.79)  (5.83)  (4.37)  (4.48)  (2.49) 
June  22.80  23.41  70.08  63.45  13.33  21.77  7.11  10.86 
  (3.96)  (2.82)  (10.89)  (8.5)  (5.54)  (4.21)  (3.99)  (2.49) 
July  25.28  26.45  73.57  60.18  10.28  20.39  8.97  11.69 
  (3.38)  (2.23)  (9.41)  (8.61)  (4.75)  (3.76)  (3.09)  (1.74) 
August  24.14  25.50  77.69  62.72  8.31  19.25  7.21  10.36 
  (3.47)  (2.58)  (8.26)  (9.07)  (4.1)  (3.59)  (3.45)  (2.22) 
September  19.02  20.55  71.44  61.91  9.76  21.03  6.96  8.98 
  (7.17)  (3.84)  (8.55)  (9.59)  (4.55)  (4.07)  (3.33)  (2.45) 
October  13.01  13.63  66.20  62.24  13.44  20.99  5.91  7.96 
  (6.73)  (3.93)  (13.99)  (11.18)  (6.94)  (3.34)  (3.34)  (2.32) 
November  5.14  6.28  71.00  62.22  13.74  20.96  4.40  6.71 
  (6.29)  (4.31)  (12.76)  (11.71)  (7.08)  (3.44)  (3.19)  (2.38) 
December  -1.51  0.84  73.78  65.48  12.37  20.34  3.68  6.35 
  (6.21)  (4.07)  (8.92)  (10.45)  (6.29)  (3.6)  (3.09)  (2.02) 
Note: IA and KS represents Red oak, Iowa and Dodge City, Kansas, respectively. Standard 
deviations are reported in parentheses.  
Source: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and WeatherBank Inc.  35 
 
Table 5. Average Beef Cattle Growth Simulation Results (1,125 Observations) 
Feed  Days on  Avg. Daily  Feed Effi-  Yield  Quality 
Composition  Feed (lbs)  Gain (lbs)  ciency (lbs)  Grade  Grade 
(see table 3)  IA  KS  IA  KS  IA  KS  IA  KS  IA  KS 
No Implant 
30:50:10:10  282  284  2.51  2.49  7.56  7.56  3.15  3.15  3.00  3.00 
40:40:10:10  273  275  2.59  2.57  7.25  7.25  3.16  3.16  3.00  3.00 
50:30:10:10  266  267  2.66  2.65  6.98  6.97  3.18  3.18  3.00  3.00 
60:20:10:10  259  260  2.73  2.72  6.72  6.71  3.19  3.19  3.00  3.00 
70:10:10:10  253  254  2.80  2.78  6.49  6.47  3.20  3.20  3.00  3.00 
80:00:10:10  247  249  2.86  2.84  6.27  6.25  3.21  3.21  3.00  3.00 
Moderate Implant – Estrogen Only 
30:50:10:10  236  237  3.00  2.99  6.80  6.78  2.93  2.93  3.83  3.83 
40:40:10:10  229  230  3.09  3.08  6.54  6.51  2.94  2.94  3.67  3.69 
50:30:10:10  223  224  3.18  3.16  6.29  6.26  2.95  2.95  3.43  3.43 
60:20:10:10  217  218  3.26  3.25  6.06  6.04  2.97  2.96  3.20  3.21 
70:10:10:10  212  213  3.34  3.32  5.85  5.82  2.98  2.98  3.12  3.12 
80:00:10:10  208  209  3.41  3.40  5.66  5.63  2.99  2.98  3.10  3.10 
Aggressive Implant - Estrogen plus Trenbolone Acetate 
30:50:10:10  212  213  3.35  3.33  6.31  6.28  2.71  2.71  4.02  4.03 
40:40:10:10  205  206  3.45  3.44  6.06  6.03  2.72  2.72  4.01  4.02 
50:30:10:10  200  201  3.55  3.53  5.83  5.80  2.73  2.73  4.01  4.01 
60:20:10:10  195  196  3.64  3.63  5.62  5.59  2.74  2.74  4.00  4.00 
70:10:10:10  190  191  3.73  3.71  5.42  5.40  2.75  2.75  3.99  3.99 
80:00:10:10  186  187  3.81  3.79  5.24  5.22  2.76  2.76  3.98  3.98 








Table 6. Optimal Contracts and Corresponding Feeding Strategies, Iowa 
Risk Preferences
  Live- or Dressed- 
Weight Pricing  Grid Pricing 
Owner  Feeder  Contract  FS  Contract  FS 
ψ  φ  α  β  γ  α  β  γ 
Unrestricted Parameter Space 
None-Low  None-Moderate  0.14  0.10  0.80  3/A  0.19  0.03  0.97  5/M 
None  High  0.03  0.09  0.93  6/A  0.19  0.03  0.97  5/M 
Low  High  0.13  0.10  0.81  5/A  0.19  0.03  0.97  5/M 
Moderate  None-Moderate  0.14  0.10  0.80  3/A  0.13  0.08  0.87  6/M 
Moderate  High  0.14  0.10  0.80  1/A  0.13  0.08  0.87  6/M 
High  None-Moderate  0.15  0.11  0.76  1/A  0.23  0.08  0.78  4/M 
High  High  0.14  0.10  0.80  1/A  0.21  0.08  0.80  4/M 
Restricted (Traditional) Parameter Space 
None  All Levels  0.05  0.00  1.19  6/M  0.05  0.00  1.19  6/M 
Low  All Levels  0.16  0.00  1.09  6/M  0.16  0.00  1.09  6/M 
Moderate  All Levels  0.00  0.40  0.00  1/A  0.26  0.00  1.00  4/M 
High  All Levels  0.00  0.40  0.00  1/A  0.37  0.00  0.90  4/M 
Note: For risk aversion, ψ = φ = 0.00025 is low, ψ = φ = 0.0025 is moderate, and ψ = 0.02 
and φ = 0.023 is high. Feeder strategy (FS) is denoted as i/j where i is the ration as defined 












Table 7. Optimal Contracts and Corresponding Feeding Strategies, Kansas 
Risk Preferences
  Live- or Dressed- 
Weight Pricing  Grid Pricing 
Owner  Feeder  Contract  FS  Contract  FS 
ψ  φ  α  β  γ  α  β  γ 
Unrestricted Parameter Space 
None-Low  None-Moderate  0.12  0.10  0.84  6/A  0.18  0.01  1.04  6/M 
None  High  0.12  0.10  0.84  6/A  0.18  0.01  1.04  6/M 
Low  High  0.12  0.10  0.84  6/A  0.18  0.01  1.04  6/M 
Moderate  None-Moderate  0.12  0.10  0.84  6/A  0.15  0.08  0.87  6/M 
Moderate  High  0.12  0.10  0.84  6/A  0.15  0.08  0.87  6/M 
High  None-Low  0.47  0.06  0.65  1/A  0.41  0.05  0.73  4/M 
High  Moderate  0.47  0.06  0.65  1/A  0.31  0.07  0.76  4/M 
High  High  0.47  0.06  0.65  1/A  0.44  0.03  0.76  4/M 
Restricted (Traditional) Parameter Space 
None  All Levels  0.19  0.00  1.06  6/M  0.19  0.00  1.06  6/M 
Low  All Levels  0.19  0.00  1.06  6/M  0.19  0.00  1.06  6/M 
Moderate  None-Low  0.00  0.44  0.00  5/A  0.34  0.00  0.93  4/M 
Moderate  Moderate  0.00  0.44  0.00  3/A  0.34  0.00  0.93  4/M 
Moderate  High  0.34  0.00  0.93  4/M  0.34  0.00  0.93  4/M 
High  None-Low  0.00  0.44  0.00  5/A  0.40  0.00  0.88  4/M 
High  Moderate  0.00  0.44  0.00  3/A  0.40  0.00  0.88  4/M 
High  High  0.00  0.44  0.00  1/A  0.40  0.00  0.88  4/M 
Note: For risk aversion, ψ = φ = 0.00025 is low, ψ = φ = 0.0025 is moderate, and ψ = 0.02 
and φ = 0.023 is high. Feeder strategy (FS) is denoted as i/j where i is the ration as defined 






Appendix 1: Step by Step Procedure for Biological Growth Simulation  
According to the genetic information provided by the TCSCF, the breed effect coefficients 
for each individual animal are obtained from the NRC (2000). Initial body condition scores 
of the animals are calculated using initial empty body fat percentages following Fox et al. 
(1992). Based on NRC (2000), all feeder steers are assumed to have hair depth of 0.5 
inches, average hide thickness (hide code 2), and medium hair coat with some mud on the 
lower body (hair coat code 2). 
Step 1: Given the initial live body weight of an animal, calculate initial shrunk and empty 
body weights and the amount of initial empty body fat according to equations 1, 2, 
and 37 in appendix table 2, respectively.   
Step 2: Determine the ration-implant strategy to be used during feeding the animal.  
Following the feed library of NRC (2000), determine energy and protein content of 
the feed on the basis of dry matter percentage (appendix table 2). Also, specify the 
type of growth promoting implant to be used and obtain the parameters for 
adjusting the expected final shrunk body weight and dry matter intake prediction.  
Step 3: From the frame score of the animal, determine expected final shrunk body weight 
(EFSBW) according to Fox et al. (1992). Adjust EFSBW for the use of implant 
(minus 45 kg for no implant, and plus 45 kg for the use of estrogen and Trenbolone 
Acetate), and calculate initial equivalent shrunk body weights for a target final 
empty body fat percentage (e.g., SRW = 478 kg for medium frame steers at 28 
percent empty body fat).   
Step 4: Given energy and protein values of the ration, predict daily dry matter intake  
(DMI,  kg/day) of the animal with necessary adjustment for body fat, breed,  39 
 
implants, current weather condition, and mud depth at the feedlot (equations 5 to 13 
in appendix table 2).   
Step 5: Compute required energy for maintenance with necessary adjustment for   direct 
effect of cold or heat stress (equations 14 to 28 in appendix table 2). 
Step 6: Calculate dry matter required for maintenance, dry matter available for growth 
  and net energy available for growth (equations 29 to 31 in appendix table 2).   
Step 7: Calculate shrunk weight gain and empty body gain according to equations 32  
  and 34 in appendix table 2.  
Step 8: Determine empty weight gain and the amount of protein and fat in empty  
  weight gain according to equations 35 and 36 in appendix table 2, respectively.   
  Add fat in gain to initial empty body fat on the previous day, and calculate empty 
  body fat percentage at the end of the day (equation 37 in appendix table 2).  
Step 9: Compute accumulated shrunk and empty body weights at the end of the day  
  according to the following equations: 
    t t t SWG SBW SBW + = −1 ; 
  t t t EWG EBW EBW + = −1 . 
Step 10: Calculate carcass weight following according to equation 40 in appendix table 2). 
Step 11: Calculate empty body and carcass fat percentage following equations 38 and  
  39 in Appendix Table 2. Using the carcass fat percentage determine yield grade 
  following Fox and Black (1984) (equation 41 in appendix table 2. Also determine 
  quality grade from the accumulated empty body fat percentage following Guiroy 
  et al. (2001).  
Step12: Repeat steps 4 to 11 for each additional day until the animal reaches target  40 
 
  slaughter weight.  
Step 13: Compute and save the number of days required to reach the target harvest  
body, average daily shrunk weight gain, total amount of dry matter consumed 
during the feedlot regime, and overall feed efficiency (dry matter consumed per 
unit of weight gain). Also, save final carcass weight, yield grade, and quality grade. 
Step 14: Repeat steps 2 to 13 for each of the available ration-implant strategies. 
Step 15: Repeat steps 1 to 14 for each individual animal. 
 
Appendix 2: The Comparative Returns Search Model in Algorithmic Form 
Step 1: Save the means and variances of the outcomes of the biophysical growth  
  simulation model performed for each of the TCSCF cattle using 18 alternative  
  ration-implant strategies. For each of the ration-implant strategies, compute the  
  variance-covariance matrix for the dependent variables of interest across all the  
  cattle.  
Step 2: Obtain historical weekly averages of live and dressed weight prices of fed cattle,  
feeder cattle, grid premiums and discounts, corn, soybean meal, and alfalfa hay 
prices. Calculate corn silage prices from corn prices. Estimate the multivariate  
densities of the price series using a Gaussian kernel function and randomly draw  
10,000 price vectors from their multivariate distributions.  
Step 3: Estimate dressing percentage from the randomly drawn live weight and dressed  
weight   prices for fed cattle by linearly regressing the former on the later (without  
an intercept term). Calculate grid base prices per pound of beef from live weight  
 41 
 
prices and estimated dressing percentages according to the formula, Grid Base  
Price = 100 × (Live Weight Price/Estimated Dressing Percentage) + 0.01.  
Step 4: For each individual animal and ration-implant strategy, compute the cattle  
  owner’s revenue from selling the fed cattle according to live, dressed and grid  
  pricing methods using the outcomes of the growth model and randomly drawn  
  prices.  
Step 5: Calculate the costs per pound dry matter of each of the rations using the  
  randomly drawn feed ingredient prices. From the total feed consumption data  
  generated by the growth simulation model and ration costs, calculate average total  
  feed cost for feeding each individual animal under alternative ration-implant  
  strategies. Calculate total feeding cost under alternative strategies by adding  
  implant and other costs to the total feed cost.    
Step 6: Compute the variance-covariance matrix of the revenues, costs, and feedlot  
  performance. 
Step 7: Calculate average partial profits (across all the cattle) of the owner under  
  alternative feeding strategies by subtracting corresponding average total costs and  
  the average value of the feeder cattle from the revenues under alternative fed  
  cattle pricing methods.  
Step 8: Determine the lower and upper bounds of the contract coefficients (α, β, and γ)  
  from the minimum and maximum attainable profits by the feeder and owner.  
  Construct a parameter space with all plausible combinations of α, β, and γ for an  
  increment of 0.01 within the corresponding intervals (0 ≤ α ≤ 0.49, 0 ≤ β ≤ 0.47,  
  and 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1.45). Save the feasible combinations of α, β, and γ in an array that  42 
 
  satisfy the participation constraints of the cattle feeder and owner. 
Step 9: For each combination of α, β, and γ in the feasible parameter space, compute the  
  feeder’s net return and utility per animal head (and also per hundred pounds of  
  weight gain) for alternative cattle feeding strategies for a constant absolute risk  
  aversion coefficient from the interval 0 ≤ ϕ ≤ 0.025.  Search for the feeder’s profit  
  and utility maximizing feeding strategies for each combination of α, β, and γ   
  under each ϕ.  
Step 10: For a constant absolute risk aversion coefficients in the range 0 ≤ ψ ≤ 0.019,  
compute the cattle owner’s profit and utility per animal head (and also per hundred 
pounds of weight gain) under alternative fed cattle pricing methods that result from 
the feeder’s optimal strategies for all feasible combinations of α, β, and γ. Search 
for the owner’s profit and utility maximizing α, β, and γ, and corresponding 
optimal feeding strategy of the feeder.   
Step 11: Save the optimal combination of α, β, and γ, corresponding feeding strategies,  
  and certainty equivalents of the cattle feeder and the owner for any particular  
  combination of ϕ and ψ.  
Step 12: Repeat Steps 9-11 for all plausible combination of ϕ and ψ with successive  
increments within the corresponding intervals of the risk aversion coefficients.  









Appendix Table 1. Glossary of the variables used in the growth model 
Variable  Description  Unit 
a1  Fasting heat production coefficient (0.072 for beef cattle)  Mcal/kg
-0.75/day 
a2  Maintenance adjustment for previous temperature  Mcal/kg
-0.75/day 
AdjDMI  DMI adjusted for breed, body fat, and weather condition  kg/day 
AdjREM  REM adjusted for cold or heat stress  Mcal/day 
BCI  Body condition score (1=emaciated, …, 9=obese)   
BE  Breed effect for maintenance   
CETI  Current month's effective temperature index 
oC 
CFP  Carcass fat percentage  % 
CW  Carcass weight  kg 
DMFM  Dry matter available for maintenance  kg/day 
DMFG  Dry matter available for gain  kg/day 
DMI  Predicted dry matter intake  kg/day 
DMIB  DMI adjustment factor for breed   
DMIBF  DMI adjustment factor for body fat content   
DMIIMP  DMI adjustment factor for the use of implant   
DMIM  DMI adjustment factor for mud depth in the feedlot   
DMIT  DMI adjustment factor for temperature   
DMITNC  DMI adjustment factor for temperature with night cooling   
EBF  Empty body fat  kg 
EBFP  Empty body fat percentage  % 
EBW  Empty body weight  kg 
EI  External insulation 
oC/Mcal/m
2/day 
EqSBW  Equivalent shrunk body weight  kg 
EWG  Empty weight gain  kg/day 
FIG  Fat in gain   
HCCode  Hair coat code (1=dry and clean, 2=some mud on lower   
  body, 3=wet and matted, 4=covered with wet snow or mud)   
HD  Hair depth  cm 
HE  Heat production  Mcal/day 
HideCode  Hide depth code (1=thin, 2=average, and 3=thick)   
HideME  Hide depth adjustment for external insulation   
HRSc  Hours of sunshine in the current month  Hours 44 
 
HRSp  Hours of sunshine in previous month  Hours 
IF  Ionophore adjustment factor   
TI  Total insulation 
oC/Mcal/m
2/day 
LCT  Lower Critical Temperature 
oC 
MCP  Microbial crude protein   
ME  Dietary content of metabolizable energy  Mcal/kg 
MEcs  Animal requirement for ME adjusted for cold stress  Mcal/day 
MP  Dietary content of metabolizable protein  g/day 
MPb  Digestible microbial protein   
MPf  Digestible undegraded feed protein   
MPg  Metabolizable protein required for gain  g/day 
Mud  Mud depth in the feedlot  cm 
MudME  Mud adjustment factor for external insulation   
NEg  Dietary content of net energy for growth  Mcal/kg 
NEm  Dietary content of net energy for maintenance  Mcal/kg 
NEmcs  Cold stress adjustment factor for REM   
NEmhs  Heat stress adjustment factor for REM   
NEFG  Net energy available for growth after maintenance  Mcal/day 
NPg  Net protein required for gain  g/day 
PEg  Protein efficiency for gain   
PETI  Previous month's effective temperature index   
PIG  Protein in gain   
PN  NEm adjustment for previous nutrition   
QG  Numerical quality grade   
RE  Retained energy  Mcal/day 
REM  Required energy for maintenance  Mcal/day 
RHc  Current relative humidity  % 
RHp  Previous relative humidity  % 
RMP  Total metabolozable protein required for maintenance  g/day 
SA  Surface area  m
2 
SBW  Shrunk body weight  kg 
SRW  Shrunk reference weight (478 kg at 28% body fat)  kg 
SWG  Shrunk weight gain  kg/day 
Tc  Current average temperature 
oC 45 
 
Tp  Previous month's average temperature 
oC 
TI  Tissue (internal) insulation 
oC/Mcal/m
2/day 
UCT  Upper critical temperature 
oC 
UIP  Undegraded feed protein   
WSc  Current wind speed  km/hour 
WSp  Previous wind speed  km/hour 






































Appendix Table 2. Equations Used in the Biophysical Growth Simulation Model  
Eq.  Condition  LHS  RHS 
1    SBWt  0.96 × LBWt 
2    EBWt  0.891× SBWt 
3    AFSBW  EFSBW + IMPEFSBW 
4    EqSBWt  (SBWt × SRW) / AFSBW 
5  Age ≤ 12 mos.  DMIt  (SBWt
0.75×(0.2435×NEmt - 0.0466×NEmt
2 - 0.1128))/NEmt 
  Age > 12 mos.    (SBWt
0.75×(0.2435×NEmt - 0.0466×NEmt
2 - 0.0869))/NEmt 
6  EqSBWt ≥ 350 kg  DMIBFt  0.7714 + 0.00196 × EqSBWt - 0.00000371 × EqSBWt
2 
  EqSBWt < 350 kg  DMIBFt  1 
7  Holstein  DMIBt  1.08 
  Holstein× British  DMIBt  1.04 
  All Other  DMIBt  1 
8  No Implant  DMIMPt  0.94 
  Estrogen  DMIMPt  1 
  Estrogen + TBA  DMIMPt  1.03 
9    CETIt  27.88 - (0.456×Tct ) + (0.010754×Tct
2) - (0.4905×RHct ) + 
      (0.00088×RHct
2) + (1.1507×(1000/3600)×WSct) - 
      (0.126447×((1000/3600)×WSct)
2)+ (0.019876×Tct×RHct) - 
      (0.046313×Tct×((1000/3600)×WSct))+(0.4167×HRSct ) 
10    DMINCt  (119.62 - 0.9708×CETIt )/100 
11  Tct  ≤ - 20
oC  DMITt  1.16 
  - 20
oC< Tct≤20
oC  DMITt  1.0433 - 0.0044 ×Tct + 0.0001×Tct
2 
  20
oC< Tct ≤ 28
oC  DMITt  ((1 - DMINCt ) × 0.75 + DMINCt )/100 + 1.05 
  Tct  > 28
oC  DMITt  ((1 - DMINCt ) × 0.75 + DMINCt )/100 + 1 
12    DMIMt  1 - 0.01 × Mudt 
13    AdjDMIt  DMIt × DMIBFt × DMIBt × DMIMP × DMITt 
14    PNt  0.8 + (BCSt - 1) × 0.05 
15    PETIt  27.88 - (0.456×Tpt )+ (0.010754×Tpt
2) - (0.4905×RHpt ) + 
      (0.00088×RHpt
2) + (1.1507×(1000/3600)×WSpt) - 
      (0.126447×((1000/3600)×WSpt)
2)+(0.019876×Tpt×RHpt) - 
      (0.046313×Tpt×((1000/3600)×WSpt))+(0.4167×HRSpt ) 
16  Tpt ≤20
oC  a2  (88.426 - 0.785 × Tpt + 0.0116 × Tpt
2 - 77)/1000 
  Tpt >20
oC  a2  (88.426 - 0.785 × PETIt + 0.0116 × PETIt
2 - 77)/1000 47 
 
17    REMt  SBWt
0.75 × ((a1 × BE × PNt) + a2) 
18    SAt  0.09 × SBWt
0.67 
19    REt  (AdjDMIt - (REMt-1/(NEm × IF))) × NEg 
20    HEt  ((MEt × AdjDMIt) - REt)/SAt 
21  HideCodet ≤ 2  MudMEt  (1 - HCCodet - 2) × 0.2 
  HideCodet > 2  MudMEt  (1 - HCCodet - 2) × 0.3 
22    HideMEt  (1 – HCCodet – 2) × 0.2 
23    EIt  (7.36 - (0.296× WSct) + (2.55× HDt)× MudMEt× HideMEt 
24    TIt  5.25 + 0.75 × BCSt 
25    INt  EIt + TIt 
26    LCTt  39 - (INt × HEt × 0.85) 
27  LCTt > Tct  MEcst  SAt × (LCTt –Tct)/INt 
  LCTt ≤ Tct  MEcst  0 
28    AdjREMt  REMt + (NEmt/MEt) × MEcst 
29    DMFMt  AdjREMt/(NEm ×IF) 
30    DMFGt  AdjDMIt – DMFMt 
31    NEFGt  DMFGt × NEg 
32  NEFGt > 0  SWGt  13.91 × (EqSBWt-1
-0.6837) × (NEFGt
0.9116) 
  NEFGt ≤ 0  SWGt  0 
33    SBWt  SBWt-1 + SWGt 
34    EWGt  0.956 × SWGt 
35    PIGt  0.254 - 0.0271 ×(NEFGt/EWGt) 
36    FIGt  0.123 ×(NEFGt/EWGt) - 0.154 
37  t = 0  EBFt  (0.00054 × EBWt
2 + 0.037 × EBWt - 0.61) × 0.85 
  t > 0    EBFt-1 + FIGt × EWGt × 0.85 
38    EBFPt  100 × (EBFt/EBWt) 
39    CFPt  0.70 + 1.0815 × EBFPt 
40    CWt  0.73 × EBWt - 22.22 
41    YGt  0.15 × CFPt - 1.7 
Note: LHS = Left hand side of the equation; RHS = Right hand side of the equation.  
Source: Tedeschi et al. (2004), NRC (2000), Fox et al. (1992), Garrett and Hinman (1969), and Fox 
and Black (1984). 
 